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JUDITH V. ROYSTER*
Oil and Water in the Indian Country
I. INTRODUCTION
Congress first authorized general oil and gas leasing on Indian lands
in the 192s. For more than seven decades, non-Indian oil and gas companies
have conducted exploration and production activities on Indian lands2 with
all of the attendant environmental effects? And yet surprisingly little attention
has been paid in Indian country by tribes 4 by the federal government,5 or by
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Tulsa, Tulsa, Oklahoma.
1. Congress amended the general leasing act for Indian lands in 1924 to permit oil and
gas leases on reservations set aside by treaty and by congressionally-ratified agreement. 25
U.S.C. § 398 (1924); see also British-American Oil Producing Co. v. Board of Equalization, 299
U.S. 159,164 (1936). In 1927, Congress again amended the act to permit oil and gas leases on
reservations set aside by executive order. 25 U.S.C. §§ 398a-388e (1927). These leasing
statutes were replaced by the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. § 396a-396g
(1938), which has now been superseded by the Indian Mineral Development Act of 1982, 25
U.S.C. §§ 2101-2108 (1991). Absent this congressional authorization, Indian lands are not
open to mineral development by non-Indians. Trade and Nonintercourse Act, 25 U.S.C.
177 (1946). On the development of mineral exploitation of Indian lands, see generally Judith
V. Royster, Mineral Development in Indian Country: The Evolution of Tribal Control Over Mineral
Resources, 29 TULSA L.J. 541, 552-94 (1994).
2. Indian lands contain some three to six percent of the nation's known oil and gas
reserves. MARJANE AMBLER, BREAKING THE IRON BONDS: INDAN CONTROL OF ENERGY
DEvELomrNT 74 (1990) (approximately three percent); A. David Lester, The Environment from
an Indian Perspective, 12(1) EPA JOURNAL 27,28 (Jan/Feb. 1986) (six percent of onshore oil and
gas). Some 40 reservations have oil and gas deposits, estimated at 4.2 billion barrels of oil
and 17.5 trillion cubic feet of gas. AMBLE, supra at 74.
3. See, e.g., United States v. Tenneco Oil Co., Complaint, No. CIV-96-0171-C (W.D.
Okla. filed Jan. 31, 1996) [hereinafter Tenneco Complaint) (alleging permanent and
irreparable pollution of the Sac and Fox Nation's groundwater by oil and gas activities);
Lyon v. Amoco Production Co., 923 P.2d 350 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996) (suit by non-Indian
landowners within Indian country alleging air, water, and soil contamination by gas wells
and drilling operations on Ute tribal lands).
4. In the early 1970s, some tribes placed a moratorium on mineral development in
order to assert greater tribal control over the mineral estate. One factor in this decision for
some tribes was the lack of environmental protection measures for tribal lands and
resources. AMBLER, supra note 2, at 72. But Indian tribes, essentially without bargaining
power prior to the Indian Mineral Development Act of 1982, lacked any real opportunity to
insist on environmental controls of oil and gas activities. See AMERICAN INDIAN POucY
REVIEW COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT: TASK FORCE SEVEN: RESERVATION AND RESOURCE
DEvELopmErr AND PROTEcnoN 49 (1976).
5. A prime example of federal inattention involves the contamination of the
groundwater of the Sac and Fox Nation. See infra text accompanying notes 114-28. In 1977,
not long after the contamination had been documented, the Nation requested the BIA to take
the lead in filing a lawsuit. Federal Government's Relationship with American Indians, Hearings
Before the Special Comm. on Investigations of the Senate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, Part 9,
101st Cong., 35 (statement of Elmer Manatowa, Chief of the Sac and Fox Nation) [hereinafter
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the oil companies6 to the regulation and control of the environmental impacts
of oil and gas development.
That lack of attention can have, and in some cases has already had,
devastating consequences for the Indian tribes. Pollution of tribal lands and
waters can impair the ability of tribes to fully function as governments for
their people and their territory.7 More importantly, pollution impacts the
heart of tribes: the land itself. The degradation or destruction of resources is
always a catastrophe, but for Indian nations it is a tragedy. Indian tribes reside
in and remain deeply committed to territories greatly diminished from their
aboriginal range. Thus, "relocation is not an option for Indian people."8
Hearings). Despite repeated requests by the Nation, no action was taken until January 1996,
when the Department of Justice filed suit against Tenneco Oil Company, raising claims of
public nuisance, private nuisance, negligence, gross negligence, breach of contract, unjust
enrichment, and violation of the Safe Drinking Water Act. Tenneco Complaint, supra note
3. As Senator DeConcini noted in 1989, "somebody is certainly doing one lousy job in
protecting the interest of the Sac and Fox Nation." Hearings, supra, at 46.
The federal government acts as trustee for Indian lands and resources. Both the Indian
Mineral Leasing Act of 1938 and the Indian Mineral Development Act of 1982 impose
enforceable fiduciary duties on the Department of the Interior. See Judith V. Royster,
Equivocal Obligations: The Federal-Tribal Trust Relationship and Conflicts of Interest in the
Development of Mineral Resources, 71 N.D. L. REV. 327, 334-38 (1995). The only specific
requirement that the Interior Department consider the environmental effects of mineral
development, however, appeared in the 1982 Act regulations, which became effective in
April 1994. See 59 Fed. Reg. 14,960 (1994). Under those regulations, the Secretary of the
Interior may not approve a mineral development agreement unless the Secretary determines
that the benefits to the tribe outweigh the adverse environmental impacts. 25 C.F.R. §
225.22(c)(2) (1995).
6. To the contrary, one of the traditional attractions of oil and gas leases on Indian
lands was the potential shelter from stricter state environmental laws. See Indian Mineral
Development: Hearings on S. 1894 Before the Senate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 97th Cong.,
178 (1982) (statement of Russel L. Barsh).
7. The Tenth Circuit recently described "the four critical elements necessary for tribal
sovereignty" as land, water rights, mineral rights, and government jurisdiction. City of
Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415,418 n.2 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 65 U.S.L.W. 3694
(Nov. 10,1997).
8. Rebecca Tsosie, Tribal Environmental Policy in an Era of Self-Determination: The Role
of Ethics, Economics and Traditional Ecological Knowledge, 21 VT. L. REV. 225,286 n.356 (1996).
Professor Tsosie notes, therefore, that Indian communities "cannot afford a catastrophe such
as Love Canal, where the only means of protecting the population from hazardous
conditions is removal." Id. See also Robert A. Williams, Jr., Large Binocular Telescopes, Red
Squirrel Pinatas, and Apache Sacred Mountains: Decolonizing Environmental Law in a Multi-
cultural World, % W. VA. L. REv. 1133,1153 (1994) ("Without the land, in other words, there
is no tribe."); Frank Pommersheim, The Reservation as Place: A South Dakota Essay, 34 S.D. L.
REv. 246, 250 (1989) ("Land is inherent to Indian people; they often cannot conceive of life
without it.'); Lester, supra note 2, at 28 ("To relocate tribal members from their homeland
would adversely affect the well-being of the tribe far beyond any damage suffered by non-
Indians. Indians simply cannot pull up roots and move as do nomadic Americans.").
OIL AND WATER IN INDIAN COUNTRY
And so this article will explore environmental regulation of oil and
gas development in Indian country, concentrating on the protection and
regulation of water resources. Part II will look at the legal bases for tribal
environmental regulation within the Indian country, with a focus on the
environmental program which seems to be the initial one for tribes to develop:
water quality standards. Part I will look at lessons for the oil and gas
industry from this tribal activity.
IL TRIBAL PROTECTION OF WATER RESOURCES
A. Tribal Environmental Regulation
Tribal authority to protect and regulate water resources flows from
two primary sources.' First, tribes retain inherent governmental powers to
regulate unless the exercise of that authority has been ceded by treaty or
abrogated by federal statute, or is otherwise "inconsistent with" the
dependent sovereign status of the tribes. Second, tribes may operate federal
programs which the federal government is authorized to delegate. These two
sources of tribal authority in environmental affairs are symbiotic.
As a general proposition, tribes retain all powers of any sovereign
that have not been lost through one of three legal mechanisms.1° The first
means is arguably voluntary: a tribe may cede its sovereign authority in a
treaty. In the environmental arena, however, there is no indication that any
tribe ceded any authority in any treaty. Second, the exercise of tribal authority
may be abrogated by federal statute. Certain aspects of tribal environmental
authority may have been abrogated or preempted by statute. For example,
several courts have held that the federal citizen suit provisions abrogate tribal
sovereign immunity from suit"' and tribal courts have been divested of
9. Treaties, which also serve as a source of tribal governmental powers, are not
specifically implicated in environmental regulation. To the extent that the important modem
issue in tribal environmental authority is the magnitude of that authority over non-Indian
activities on fee lands, the US. Supreme Court has essentially held that any treaty-reserved
power to regulate on fee lands has been abrogated by loss of title to those lands. Inherent
tribal authority to regulate, however, can survive the abrogation of the treaty right. See
generally Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981); Brendale v. Yakima Indian Nation,
492 U.S. 408 (1989); South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993).
10. FELux S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDiAN LAW 122-23 (1942) (tribes retain all
powers that are not limited by treaty or act of Congress); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian
Tribe, 435 US. 191, 208 (1978) (tribal powers may be implicitly divested as inconsistent with
tribal status).
11. See, e.g., Blue Legs v. United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 867 F.2d 1094,1096-97
(8th Cir. 1989) (Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)); Backcountry Against
Dumps v. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 100 F.3d 147, 152 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
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jurisdiction to hear citizen suits under the environmental statutes. 2 Similarly,
federal environmental statutes may preempt tribal authority to regulate in a
manner inconsistent with the statutory scheme. The Hazardous Materials
Transportation Act, 3 for example, prohibits any tribal or state regulation of
the transport of hazardous materials that is not "substantively the same" as
federal regulations. 4 Beyond these specific statutory pro'visions, however, the
federal environmental statutes do not abrogate or contract inherent tribal
governmental powers.
Inherent tribal authority may, however, be lost through the implicit
divestiture doctrine first articulated in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe' and
applied to tribal regulatory powers in Montana v, United States.17 Under this
theory, tribes retain full regulatory authority over tribal members and tribal
lands," but may exercise authority over nonmembers on fee land 9 only in
certain circumstances. For environmental purposes, the most important of
those circumstances is determined by the "direct effects" test from Montana:
tribes retain inherent regulatory authority over nonmembers on fee lands
(RCRA); Atlantic States Legal Found. v. Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community, 827
F. Supp. 608, 609-10 (D. Ariz. 1993) (RCRA and Clean Water Act); Public Sert. Co. v.
Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 30 F.3d 1203, 1206-07 (9th Cir. 1994) (Hazardous Materials
Transportation Act). But see James M. Grijalva, Environmental Citizen Suits in Indian Country,
in 8TH ANNUAL CON. ON ENV'T & DEv. IN INDIAN CouNTRY (ABA SONREEL 1996) (arguing
that subjecting tribes to citizen suits is contrary to the doctrine requiring Congress to clearly
state its intent to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity, and will interfere with the EPA's
policy of government-to-government relations with tribes).
12. Blue Legs, 867 F.2d at 1097-98.
13. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1819 (1988 & Supp. 111990, Supp. 1111991, Supp. IV 1992))
14. The Act directs the Secretary of Transportation to issue regulations "for the safe
transportation of hazardous materials," including the designation of hazardous materials;
packing, handling, and labeling requirements; shipping documentation; notification and
reporting requirements; and requirements for packages and containers used in
transportation. 49 U.S.C. § 1804(a). Any law or regulation of a state or Indian tribe on these
subjects which is not "substantively the same" as the federal law or regulation is preempted.
49 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(5). See Northern States Power Co. v. Prairie Island Mdewakanton Sioux
Indian Community, 991 F.2d 458 (8th Cir. 1993).
15. On the contrary, the federal laws, by treating tribes as states, generally expressly
recognize tribal authority to regulate. See infra text accompanying notes 25-28.
16. 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978) (holding that tribes are impliedly divested of criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians because it is inconsistent with their status as dependent
sovereigns).
17. 450 U.S. 544,563-65 (1981). See generally N. Bruce Duthu, Implicit Divestiture of Tribal
Powers: Locating Legitimate Sources of Authority in Indian Country, 19 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 353
(1994).
18. Montana, 450 U.S. at 505; Brendale v. Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 445
(Stevens, J.), 460 (Blackmun, J.) (1989).
19. "Fee lands," in this context, refers to lands owned in fee by nonmembers of the tribe.
Lands held in trust or subject to a restriction on alienation, as well as lands owned in fee by
the tribe or its members, are referred to in this article as "tribal lands" or "Indian lands."
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where the nonmember conduct "threatens or has some direct effect on" tribal
sovereign interests such as economic security, political integrity, or health and
welfare.
In its subsequent decision in Brendale v. Yakima Indian Nation,2' the
Court arguably made the direct effects test more stringent and therefore more
difficult for tribes to meet. Justice White, author of the four-justice plurality
opinion, posited that nonmember conduct "must be demonstrably serious and
must imperil" tribal sovereign interests for inherent tribal authority to
survive.2 Justice Blackmun, writing for three dissenting justices, argued that
tribes retain their inherent authority where nonmember conduct impacts
"significant" tribal interests.' Nonetheless, a few years later in South Dakota
v. Bourland, the Court simply quoted the Montana test as the applicable law
without even referring to any of the language used in Brendale.4 It thus
appears that the Montana version of the direct effects test survives intact.
In addition to the exercise of retained inherent powers, tribes may
also regulate environmental matters pursuant to federal authorization. Tribes,
like states, are generally authorized under the federal environmental statutes"
20. 450 U.S. at 566.
21. 492 U.S. 408 (1998).
22. Id. at 431.
23. Id. at 457.
24. 508 U.S. 679, 695 (1993); see also Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 117 S. Ct. 1404,1409 (1997).
On remand from Bourland, the Eighth Circuit expressly declined to decide whether Brendale
had modified the Montana direct effects test, on the ground that the result in the case before
it would be the same in any case. South Dakota v. Bourland, 39 F.3d 868, 870 n.4 (8th Cir.
1994); see also Lower Brule Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 917 F. Supp. 1434, 1446 & n.17
(D.S.D. 1996). The dissenting judge in Bourland noted that the Supreme Court's Bourland
opinion merely quoted Montana exactly. "I see nothing in the Supreme Court's Bourland
decision, which remanded this case, to indicate that Brendale altered the inquiry under
Montana." 39 F.3d at 871 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
25. This article will concentrate on the Water Acts: the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994 & Supp. 1 1995)), and the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), 42
U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j (1994). Statutory provisions that treat tribes as states, however, are found
in all the major federal environmental statutes, with one exception. See, e.g., Clean Air Act
§ 301(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d) (1994); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion, and Liability Act § 126, 42 U.S.C. § 9626 (1994). The exception is the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1994 & Supp. I 1995).
Although the EPA proposed rules for tribes to take primacy for the RCRA municipal solid
waste landfill permit program, 61 Fed. Reg. 2584 (1996), and the hazardous waste
management program, 61 Fed. Reg. 30,472 (1996), the D.C. Circuit subsequently held that
the EPA has no authority under the statute to approve a tribal solid waste management plan.
Backcountry Against Dumps v. EPA, 100 F.3d 147,151 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The court held that
RCRA's plain language requires "states" to submit solid waste management plans, that
RCRA defines Indian tribes as municipalities and not as states, and that therefore treating
Indian tribes as states under RCRA violates the express language of the act. Id. at 150-51. But
see Nance v. EPA, 645 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied sub nom., Crow Tribe of Indians v.
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to take primacy for the federal programs.2 Unlike states, however, tribes must
be certified by the EPA for treatment as a state (TAS) in order take primacy
for a federal program.? Tribes seeking program authorization must meet
three basic requirements. Those requirements under the two Water Acts are
similar: tribes must demonstrate that they have a functioning government,
that the program they seek to operate is within their jurisdiction, and that they
will be reasonably capable of carrying out the federal program.2
EPA, 454 U.S. 1081 (1981) (upholding EPA's approval for the Northern Cheyenne Tribe to
redesignate the air quality of its reservation at a time when the Clean Air Act had not been
amended to accord redesignation authority to tribes). The Backcountry court remarked,
however, that nothing in its decision affected the continuing sovereign right of the tribe to
control solid waste management activities within its territory. 100 F.3d at 151.
26. See CWA § 518,33 U.S.C. § 1377; SDWA § 1451,42 U.S.C. § 300j-11. Primacy, in this
context, means that a state or tribe has received approval from the EPA to operate a federal
environmental program within that state's or tribe's territory.
27. Originally the EPA required tribes to seek treatment as a state as a preliminary step.
Only after this prequalification could tribes apply for program authorization. In 1994,
however, the EPA merged the two-step process into one: tribes may now seek the TAS
designation as part of their application for program authorization. Indian Tribes: Eligibility
of Indian Tribes for Financial Assistance, 59 Fed. Reg. 13,814 (1994) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pts. 35,130) (amendment to interim final rule on financial assistance); Indian Tribes;
Eligibility for Program Authorization, 59 Fed. Reg. 64,339 (1994) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pts, 123,124,131,142,144,145,233,501) (final rule on program authorization). In addition,
once a tribe has initial approval as a state, applications for other programs or assistance need
only provide additional information unique to those other programs. 40 C.F.R. § 131.8(b)(6)
(1996); see also Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation That Pertain to
Standards on Indian Reservations, see Fed. Reg. 64,876 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt.
131) 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876, 64,883, 64,885 (1991).
28. The SDWA provides that a tribe may be treated as a state if:
(A) the Indian Tribe is recognized by the Secretary of the Interior and has
a governing body carrying out substantial governmental duties and
powers;
(B) the functions to be exercised by the Indian Tribe are within the area of
the Tribal Government's jurisdiction; an
(C) the Indian Tribe is reasonably expected to be capable, in the
Administrator's judgment, of carrying out the functions to be exercised in
a manner consistent with the terms and purposes of this subchapter and of
all applicable regulations.
42 U.S.C. § 300j-11(b)(1); see also 40 C.F.R. § 142.72 (1996) (public water system program); id.
§ 145.52 (underground injection control program).
The CWA provides that a tribe may be treated as a state if:
(A) the tribe has a governing body carrying out substantial governmental
duties and powers;
(B) the functions to be exercised by the Indian tribe pertain to the
management and protection of water resources which are held by an Indian
tribe, held by the United States in trust for Indians, held by a member of an
Indian tribe if such property interest is subject to a trust restriction on
alienation, or otherwise within the borders of an Indian reservation; and
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The TAS requirement of tribal jurisdiction, although generating some
controversy as to fee lands, is clear as to Indian lands. At its barest minimum,
inherent tribal authority extends to tribal members and Indian lands.2 By
contrast, states may exercise jurisdiction over Indian persons and lands within
Indian country' only in "exceptional circumstances"' or where Congress has
expressly granted that authority to the states?2 The EPA has long maintained,
however, that the federal environmental laws do not represent a
(C) the Indian tribe is reasonably expected to be capable, in the
Administrator's judgment, of carrying out the functions to be exercised in
a manner consistent with the terms and purposes of this chapter and of all
applicable regulations.
33 U.S.C. § 1377(e); see also 40 C.F.R. § 131.8.
The EPA has expressly noted that the first requirement under the Water Acts-the
recognition and substantial governmental functions components- is functionally identical.
Accordingly, a tribe which meets that requirement under either of the Water Acts will
establish that it meets the requirement under both. Indian Tribes: Eligibility of Indian Tribes
for Financial Assistance, 59 Fed. Reg. 13,814, 13,815 (1994) (financial assistance); Indian
Tribes: Eligibility of Indian Tribes for Program Authorization, 59 Fed. Reg. 13,820, 13,821
(1994) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 123,131,142,144,145,233,501). The EPA will continue
its case by case review of the remaining two requirements: tribal jurisdictional authority and
programmatic capability. 59 Fed. Reg. at 13,816; id. at 13,822.
29. See cases cited supra note 18; see also White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448
U.S. 136,144 (1980); New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324,332 (1983).
30. 'Indian country" is defined as:
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction
of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any
patent, and including rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all
dependent Indian communities... and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian
titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running
through the same.
18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1994).
Although the definition is found in the criminal code, it applies in the civil context as well.
See DeCoteau v. Dist. County Court, 420 U.S. 425,427 n.2 (1975); Pittsburg & Midway Coal
Mining Co. v. Watchman, 52 F3d 1531,1540-41 (10th Cir. 1995); Mustang Production Co. v.
Harrison, 94 F.3d 1382, 1385 (10th Cir. 1996) cert. denied sub nom., Mustang Fuel Corp. v.
Hatch, 117 S. Ct. 1288 (1997). In addition, in the context of a tax dispute, the Supreme Court
recently held that the relevant issue in determining whether land is Indian country under
§ 1151(a) is not the existence of a formal reservation, but rather whether the lands have been
set aside for the use of Indians under federal protection. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Sac and
Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114, 125, 128 (1993); see also Oklahoma Tax Comn'n v. Citizen Band
Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma, 498 U.S. 505, 511 (1991).
31. Mescalero Apache, 462 U.S. at 331-32. The only "exceptional circumstance" cited by
the Court was state regulation of treaty reserved rights to hunt and fish as reasonable and
necessary for conservation of species. Id. at 332.
32. See, e.g., Public Law 280, which required some and permitted all other states to take
civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indians within the Indian country. Act of Aug. 15,1953,
Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953), as amended by the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968,
Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 78 (1968).
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congressional grant of authority to the states to regulate, and that position was
upheld by the federal courts as it pertains to Indian lands.3 As to tribal lands,
then, the jurisdictional lines are dear: tribes retain their inherent authority and
nothing in the federal environmental statutes granted any regulatory power
to the states.
Regulatory authority over fee lands within Indian country, however,
is a more complicated issue.3 The EPA has consistently taken the position that
reservations? must be treated as "single administrative units,"36 rejecting as
unworkable and environmentally unsound the checkerboard principle that
would allow states to take primacy for nonmember lands and waters within
Indian country.37 Instead, states have no authority to extend their
environmental programs within reservations absent a congressional grant of
authority.'
Because the EPA posits that the federal environmental statutes do
not operate as a grant of authority to the states, even as to fee lands,39 the
states must find some grant of authority independent of the federal
environmental laws. No state has been able to do so. States are thus barred
33. Washington Dep't of Ecology v. EPA, 752 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1985) (Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act); see also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. EPA, 803 F.2d 545, 552
(10th Cir. 1986) ("All parties agree that the Oklahoma state government has no power to
prescribe an underground injection control program regulating the Osage Indian Reserve.").
34. The Washington Dep't of Ecology court, for example, expressly declined to decide
"whether Washington is empowered to create a program reaching into Indian country when
that reach is limited to non-Indians." Id. at 1468.
35. The EPA considers "trust lands formally set apart for the use of Indians" to be
reservations, citing Citizen Band, 498 U.S. at 511. Amendments to Water Quality Standards
Regulations That Pertain to Standards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876, 64,881
(1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 131). See also Sac and Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114.
36. EPA, FEDERAL, TRIBAL AND STATE ROLES IN THE PROTEctON AND REGULATION OF
RESERVATION ENVIRONMENTS: A CONCEPT PAPER 3 (1991) [hereinafter EPA CONCEPT PAPER].
37. Amendments to Water Quality Standards Regulations That Pertain to Standards on
Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. at 64,876, 64,878.
38. See, e.g., 45 Fed. Reg. 33,066, 33,378 (1980); EPA, ADMINISTRATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL
PROGRAMS ON INDIAN LANDS: EPA INDIAN WORK GROUP DIScussON PAPER 9 (1983).
39. Based on the court's decision in Washington Dep't of Ecology, the State of Washington
amended its RCRA petition to assert authority only over non-Indian hazardous waste
activities on Indian lands. Washington; Final Authorization of State Hazardous Waste
Management Program, 51 Fed. Reg. 3782, 3783 (1986) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 271). The
EPA rejected this approach, stating that absent independent state authority to regulate
within Indian country, the EPA would retain jurisdiction 'on Indian lands," which the EPA
interpreted as synonymous with Indian country. Id. Nothing daunted, the State of
Washington asserted jurisdiction under the Safe Drinking Water Act over underground
injection wells on Indian lands. 53 Fed. Reg. 43,080 (1988). The EPA noted that the state's
argument was the same one rejected in Washington Dep't of Ecology, only weaker because the
SDWA, unlike RCRA, treated tribes as states and therefore directly contemplated tribal
regulation. EPA accordingly denied the state's application.
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from taking primacy under the federal statutes anywhere within Indian
country. The issue then becomes the extent to which tribes are eligible for
primacy over fee lands within their territories.
Although the Clean Water Act, at least, seems by its plain language
to recognize tribal jurisdiction over all surface waters within reservation
boundaries,4 the EPA has interpreted the statutory language otherwise.
According to the EPA, the Water Acts do not constitute a blanket
authorization for tribes to regulate throughout their territories, but rather
recognize the inherent rights of tribes." As a consequence, the EPA has
determined, the Water Acts authorize tribes to take primacy for federal
programs to the extent that the tribes would have inherent authority to
regulate.
In order to determine whether tribes have inherent authority to
operate the federal programs on fee lands as well as Indian lands,' the EPA
applies the Montana direct effects test0 as modified by the Court in Brendale
v. Yakima Indian Nation and reaffirmed in South Dakota v. Bourland." Before
the EPA will authorize a tribe to take primacy on nonmember as well as
Indian lands, the agency must be satisfied that "the potential impacts of
40. As noted, the CWA refers to "water resources which are held by an Indian tribe,
held by the United States in trust for Indians, held by a member of an Indian tribe if such
property interest is subject to a trust restriction on alienation, or otherwise within the borders
of an Indian reservation." 33 U.S.C. § 1377e(2) (1994) (emphasis added). Justice White, writing
for the plurality in Brendale, cited § 1377(e) as an example of express congressional
delegation to tribes. Brendale v. Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 428 (1989). More
recently, a federal district judge noted that § 1377(e) "seems to indicate plainly that Congress
did intend to delegate such authority to tribes," and noted the 'common-sense of that
interpretation. Montana v. EPA, 941 F. Supp. 945, 951-52 (D. Mont. 1996).
41. Amendments to Water Quality Standards Regulations That Pertain to Standards on
Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876,64,880 (1991). The EPA's conclusion was based on
its reading of the legislative history as "ambiguous and inconclusive," noting that 'if
Congress had intended to make a change as important as an expansion of Indian authority
to regulate nonmembers, it probably would have done so through statutory language and
discussed the change in the committee reports." Id. at 64,879.
42. As noted earlier, tribes retain full authority over activities on Indian lands. See supra
text accompanying notes 29-33.
43. 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981); see supra text accompanying note 20.
44. Brendale, 492 U.S. 408 (1989); South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993).
Although Bourland does not appear to apply a modified Montana direct effects test, but
rather simply quotes the Montana language, see supra text accompanying note 24, the EPA
has taken a cautious approach. The EPA rejected the idea that Brendale had overruled
Montana, but also recognized that a majority of justices in Brendale had attempted to
reformulate the language of the Montana test. Accordingly, EPA interpreted Brendale as
requiring, under the Montana test, some impact on tribal interests that is more than de
minimis. See Amendments to Water Quality Standards Regulations That Pertain to Standards
on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876,64,877-78 (1991).
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regulated activities on the tribe are serious and substantial."4 Nonetheless,
the EPA believes that tribes generally will be able to satisfy that threshold
requirement because "the activities regulated under the various
environmental statutes generally have serious and substantial impacts on
human health and welfare."4 More specifically, the EPA has stated that the
CWA itself represents a congressional determination that activities which
affect the quality of surface waters have serious and substantial impacts on
health and welfare.' Thus, although the EPA will continue to make a case-
specific determination of jurisdiction for each tribe, it believes that tribes
will ordinarily be able to make the required showing. '
The EPA's approach has now been approved by the federal courts.
In Montana v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),49 the court noted
that the EPA's interpretation of the federal environmental laws and the
agency's reconciliation of its environmental policy with its Indian policy
were entitled to substantial deference.s Based on its review of the Montana-
Brendale-Bourland line of cases, the court held that the EPA's interpretation
was consistent with the agency's regulations, and neither arbitrary or*
capricious nor contrary to law.51
Thus, in environmental matters, the relationship between inherent
tribal regulatory authority and tribal primacy under the federal statutes is
symbiotic. Tribes retain authority to regulate water resources on
nonmember fee lands as well as Indian lands when the nonmember
activities affecting the water resources have the potential for substantial
impacts on reservation health and welfare. Because the control and
prevention of water pollution are crucial to health and welfare, nonmember
45. Id.; see also Subtitle D Regulated Facilities; State/Tribal Permit Program
Determination of Adequacy, State/Tribal Implementation Rule (STIR), 61 Fed. Reg. 2584,
2590 (1996) (to be codified at C.F.R. pts. 239, 258) (proposed State/Tribal Implementation
Rule for municipal solid waste facilities). The specific requirements of a tribal TAS
application are detailed at 40 C.F.R. § 131.8(b) (1996) (CWA); and 40 C.F.R. §§ 142.72 and
145.52 (1996) (SDWA).
46. Amendments to Water Quality Standards Regulations That Pertain to Standards on
Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. at 64,878.
47. Id. The same analysis should apply to the Safe Drinking Water Act and effects on
groundwater.
48. Amendments to Water Quality Standards Regulations That Pertain to Standards on
Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876,64,877. Where a tribe cannot show jurisdiction over
one or more specific on-reservation sources, however, the EPA will retain federal
jurisdiction. EPA CoNcmEr PAPER, supra note 36, at 3-4.
49. 941 F. Supp. 945 (D. Mont. 1996). The case is presently on appeal to the Ninth
Circuit.
50. Id. at 956, 958. See also Washington Dep't of Ecology, 752 F.2d at 1469; City of
Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415, 422 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 65 U.S.L.W. 3694
(Nov. 10,1997).
51. Montana v. EPA, 941 F. Supp. at 958.
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activities that have the potential to adversely affect water resources will
have the requisite substantial impacts. In consequence, tribes should
generally have inherent authority to regulate the waters of Indian country
and should also, if they choose, be authorized by the EPA to operate the
federal programs of the Water Acts.
B. Tribal Primacy and Water Quality Standards
Indian tribes have moved relatively slowly to take primacy under
the federal environmental laws, and much of the tribal activity has taken
place under the Clean Water Act. A 1994 survey showed that 77 tribes have
TAS under the Water Acts, several under more than one program. 2
Although the vast majority of these TAS approvals are for grant programs
or other programs that may provide federal financial assistance, several
tribes have taken primacy for water quality programs. In particular, a
number of tribes have TAS under section 303 of the Clean Water Act for the
purpose of establishing water quality standards.'
Section 303 mandates state promulgation of water quality standards
(WQS), designed to supplement the national technology-based effluent
standards for surface waters.' Unlike the technology-based standards,
52. GOVER, STEON AND WILLIAMS, SURVEY oF TRIBAL ACnONS TO PROTECT WATER
QUALITY AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE C.EAN WATER ACT 54 (1994) [hereinafter WATER
QUAUTY SURVEY.
53. Id. The survey reports that 76 tribes had received TAS under CWA section 106,33
U.S.C. § 1256 (1994), which provides grants for pollution control programs. In addition, 16
tribes had received TAS for the dean lakes program under CWA section 314,33 U.S.C § 1324
(1994 & Supp. 11995), and five for the nonpoint source management program under CWA
section 319,33 U.S.C. § 1329 (1994). Both programs call for financial assistance to states for
program implementation. See 33 U.S.C § 1324(b), § 1329(h). As to the tribal focus on these
two programs, the survey notes that: 'It is not clear whether this reflects especially severe
problems in these areas, or whether the Tribes simply are grabbing at any kind of EPA
funding available.' WATER QUALIrY SURVEY, supra note 52, at 55.
54. The survey reports that five tribes had received TAS under CWA section 303, 33
U.S.C. § 1313 (1994). WATER QUALr Y SURVEY, supra note 52, at 54. In Appendix 2, it identifies
these tribes as the Eastern Band of Cherokee (page 7), the Pueblos of Isleta (page 22), Sandia
(page 39), and San Juan (page 40), and the Seminole Tribe of Florida (page 42). The appendix
also revealed at least five tribes with CWA section 303 TAS applications pending or in
process. Since the survey data were collected, at least five additional tribes have received
TAS under CWA section 303: the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead
Reservation, and four tribes in Wisconsin: the Sokaogon (Mole Lake) Chippewa, the Oneida,
the Menominee, and the Lac du Flambeau Band of Chippewa.
55. For more detail on the WQS program, see generally David S. Baron, Water Quality
Standards for Rivers and Lakes: Emerging Issues, 27 ARIz. ST. L.J. 559 (1995). See also James M.
Grijalva, Tribal Governmental Regulation of Non-Indian Polluters of Reseroation Waters, 71 N.D.
L REV. 433,450-53 (1995).
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which are set uniformly for point source discharges,"' WQS are established
for the particular receiving body of water.5 7 The state first determines the
designated uses for each water body within its jurisdiction.s Designated
uses must protect existing uses of waterways" and are subject to a federal
minimum standard that fishable/swimmable uses be protected.' In
addition, states are required to consider a federal list of use designations,6
but are nonetheless expressly free to adopt designated uses that are more
protective than the federal standards.' Once a state has designated the uses
of its surface waters, it promulgates WQS designed to achieve and protect
those uses.' State WQS may be in the form of either numeric criteria or
narrative standards," although numeric criteria are required where
possible.' Water quality criteria may be based on the EPA's suggested
criteria, modified as necessary for local conditions, or on any method
grounded in sound science."
State WQS and the use designations upon which the WQS are based
are then submitted to the EPA for approval. 7 In order to approve proposed
WQS, the EPA must determine that the proposed WQS: (a) are consistent
with the CWA and the federal implementing regulations, (b) will protect the
designated uses, (c) are based on adequate scientific analysis, and (d) will
protect downstream WQS.* Economic feasibility is not a factor in the EPA's
approval process.69
56. CWA § 301,33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1994 & Supp. 11995).
57. CWA § 303(c)(2)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A).
58. 40 C.F.R. § 131.10 (1995).
59. 40 C.F.R. § 131.12, § 131.10(h)C(i) (1996).
60. CWA § 101(a)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (1994). The "fishable/swimmable" label is
a shorthand designation for the congressional goal, expressed in CWA section 101(a)(2), of
"water quality which provides for the protection of fish, shellfish, and wildlife and provides
for recreation in and on the water."
61. CWA § 303(c)(2)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A) (1994). These uses include "public
water supplies, protection and propagation of fish, shellfish and wildlife, recreation in and
on the water, agricultural, industrial, ind other purposes including navigation." 40 C.F.R.
§ 131.10(a).
62. CWA § 510,33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1994).
63. CWA § 303(c)(2)(A), 33 U.S.C § 1313(c)(2)(A).
64. See CWA § 304(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a) (1994). Both types are typically used, with
narrative criteria such as "no odor" applied to all waters, and numeric criteria developed for
each designated use category. See Baron, supra note 55, at 571.
65. 40 C.F.R. § 131.11(b) (1996).
66. Id.
67. CWA § 303(c)(2)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A) (1994).
68. 40 C.F.R. § 131.5(a), § 131.10(b).
69. Homestake Mining Co. v. EPA, 477 F. Supp. 1279,1283 (D.S.D. 1979); see also City
of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415,426 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 65 U.S.L.W. 3694
(Nov. 10, 1997) (noting that the attainability of more stringent state or tribal standards "is
a matter for the EPA to consider in its discretion').
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Tribes that take primacy under section 303 of the CWA have
essentially the same rights and obligations as states for the surface waters
within their jurisdictions.' As noted, a tribe's jurisdiction will extend to all
waters within the boundaries of the reservation so long as the tribe can
demonstrate to EPA's satisfaction that activities on nonmember lands have
the potential for serious and substantial impacts on tribal sovereign interests
such as health and welfare.' Because pollutant discharges from point
sources on fee lands within Indian country have that potential, the EPA has
granted full territorial primacy over surface waters to tribes.' Tribes with
primacy under section 303, therefore, will generally designate uses and
establish WQS for all waters within the exterior boundaries of their
reservations.
Tribes with TAS under section 303 also have the same right as states
to promulgate WQS that are stricter than the federal minimum standards. 3
The statutory grant of authority to tribes does not expressly refer to the
savings clause in section 510 of the CWA, which preserves more stringent
state authority. 4 Nonetheless, because section 510 only recognizes inherent
state authority, and because Indian tribes also retain inherent powers of
environmental regulation, the section 510 savings clause for states does not
limit tribal governmental authority.'m Instead, the EPA's position that tribes
may establish more stringent WQS is reasonable because that authority
comports with inherent tribal governmental powers.' Consequently, tribes
70. City ofAlbuquerque, 97 F.3d at 423 n.9; see generally CWA § 518(e), 33 US.C. § 1377(e)
(1994). For more detailed examinations of tribal WQS, see Grijalva, supra note 55, and Denise
D. Fort, State and Tribal Water Quality Standards Under the Clean Water Act: A Case Study, 35
NAT. RESOURCESJ. 771 (1995).
71. Segenerally Montana v. EPA, 941 F. Supp. 945,957-58 (D. Mont. 19%); see also supra
text accompanying notes 45-48.
72. For example, in granting primacy to the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes
of the Flathead Reservation, the EPA noted nonmember activities such as "discharges from
an RV park and campground, discharges from sewage treatment plants, discharges from a
town's storm drains, leakage from gasoline service stations, diesel fuel spills, and gas tank
overflows." Montana v. EPA, 941 F. Supp at 958. The EPA also determined that the Tribes
needed "clean water for a domestic water supply and to maintain fish, aquatic life and other
wildlife for both subsistence and cultural reasons." Id. Because the nonmember discharges
had the potential for serious and substantial effects on the tribal need for clean water, and
thus on tribal health and welfare, the EPA found that the Tribes retained inherent authority
to set WQS for all surface waters within the Flathead Reservation. Id.
73. City of Albuquerque, 97 F.3d at 423.
74. That is, CWA section 518(e), 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e), lists a number of the sections of the
CWA for which the EPA is authorized to treat tribes as states. Not included in this list is
CWA section 510, 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1994), which preserves the right of states to adopt
measures more stringent than the federal minimum standards.
75. City of Albuquerque, 97 F.3d at 423.
76. Id.
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with section 303 primacy may promulgate WQS that protect unique tribal
uses and values. '
Although tribes have moved cautiously to take primacy for the
CWA programs, at least ten tribes have now received primacy under the
section 303 program for WQS," and a number of those tribes have already
established designated uses and water quality criteria. Federal courts have
upheld the right of tribes to exercise environmental authority over all
waters within the reservation and to promulgate WQS which are more
stringent than the federal minimum standards. With their basic rights to
operate as states under the CWA recognized, more tribes can be expected
to seek primacy for the environmental programs.
III. LESSONS FROM THE WQS FRONT
Although most tribal activity under the Water Acts has been
focused on the water quality program, WQS have limited applicability to
oil and gas exploration and production activities. Nonetheless, the
development of tribal WQS offers three levels of lessons for the oil and gas
industry. The first level of lessons is the extent to which tribal WQS affect
oil companies operating in or near Indian country. Despite their limited
applicability, tribal WQS may directly impact oil and gas operations in
several ways. The second level of lessons concerns the ability and
willingness of tribes to assume program primacy under the federal
environmental laws. As tribes begin to expand their reach, tribes with oil
and gas activities in their territories may take primacy over programs such
as the underground injection control program that offer direct regulation of
oilfield development. And at the third level, the lesson is a broader one of
respecting the governmental authority of Indian tribes over the resource
development of their lands.
A. Applicability of Tribal WQS
The primary importance of water quality standards is their
applicability in discharge permits. The CWA prohibits the discharge of any
pollutant from a point source into the navigable waters without a permit
under the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES)
77. The Isleta Pueblo, for example, designated a use of the Rio Grande running through
the Pueblo for 'primary contact ceremonial use,' and promulgated stringent water quality
criteria to achieve that use. See City of Albuquerque, 97 F.3d at 428-29 (upholding the EPA's
approval of the designated use against a claim that it violated the Establishment Clause). For
a discussion of tribal incorporation of traditional values into environmental decisionmaking,
see Tsosie, supra note 8, at 288-300.
78. See supra note 54.
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program." NPDES permits, in turn, limit the discharge of specified
pollutants in two ways. All NPDES permits contain technology-based
effluent standards that limit the amount, rate, and concentration of
pollutants that can be released.8° In addition, permits may contain further
effluent limitations based not on technology, but on the WQS set for the
receiving body of water.8
Water quality-based limitations are incorporated into NPDES
permits in any of four ways. First, states and tribes may, at their option and
with federal approval, take primacy for the NPDES permit program.82 If a
state, or a tribe treated as a state, takes primacy for the NPDES program and
establishes WQS, it will incorporate its WQS into the NPDES permits
through additional effluent limitations as it deems necessary. Second, if a
state or tribe has not taken primacy for the NPDES program and the EPA
therefore issues NPDES permits within that jurisdiction," the state or tribe
may review the federal permits within its territory for compliance with its
WQS.' Under section 401 of the CWA, a state or tribe may certify the
federally-permitted activity, certify it with conditions, or refuse certification
in which case the federal permit may not issue." Third, if the EPA issues a
NPDES permit, the permit limitations must protect the WQS of the
downstream states or tribes. EPA regulations, upheld as reasonable by the
United States Supreme Court, require that federal NPDES permits "ensure
compliance with the applicable water quality requirements of all affected
79. CWA § 402,33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1994).
80. See CWA § 402(a)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(2); CWA § 301(b)(1)(A), 33 U.S.C. §
1311(b)(1)(A) (1994).
81. CWA § 402(a)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(2); CWA § 301(b)(1)(C), 33 U.S.c. §1311(b)(1)(C).
82. CWA § 402(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b). To date, no tribe has taken primacy for the
NPDES permit program. WATER QUALITY SURVEY, supra note 52, at 55.
83. As noted earlier, states are required to promulgate WQS for waters within their
jurisdictions. CWA § 303, 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (1994). Several tribes have TAS for purposes of
setting WQS. WATER QUALrTY SURVEY, supra note 52, at 54.
84. The federal government retains the authority to issue NPDES permits within any
state or reservation where the state or tribe has not taken primacy for the NPDES program.
See CWA § 402(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (1994).
85. See Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 103 (1992) (noting that "the EPA has
construed the Act as requiring that EPA-issued NPDES permits also comply with § 401(a)").
86. 33 U.S.C § 1341 (1994). See generally Debra L Donahue, The Untapped Power of Clean
Water Act Section 401, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 201 (1996). To date, three tribes, including the
Pueblos of Sandia and San Juan, have received TAS under the § 401 certification program.
WATER QUALIrM SURVEY, supra note 52, at 54, app. 2 at 39, 40.
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States," 87 including tribes treated as states for the purpose of setting WQS.8
And fourth, even if a state or tribe has taken primacy for the NPDES
program, it is required to at least consider the WQS of downstream states
in its permit decisions. The issuing state or tribe must provide notice to
affected states and tribes, and either accept or explain its rejection of written
recommendations by the affected governments." An affected state or tribe
that is dissatisfied with the upstream government's permit decision may
request that the EPA exercise its authority to block any state or tribal
NPDES permit which is inconsistent with the CWA.90
The oil and gas industry, however, operates largely apart from the
NPDES program. First, the CWA regulates the discharge of "pollutants,"
and oilfield water or other materials injected into state-approved wells" are
expressly exempted from the definition of "pollutant." 2 Thus, the
underground disposal of oilfield wastes and the injection of produced water
for secondary recovery are not subject to the NPDES permit program.
Second, the EPA is prohibited from requiring a NPDES permit for
uncontaminated stormwater runoff from oil and gas operations. 3 But most
87. Arkansas, 503 U.S. at 105 (quoting State Program Requirements, 40 C.F.R. § 123.25
(1991)).
88. See City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415, 423-24 (10th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 65 U.S.L.W. 3694 (Nov. 10,1997).
89. CWA § 402(b)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(3); CWA § 402(b)(5), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(5).
90. CWA § 402(d)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(2); see also International Paper Co. v. Ouellette,
479 U.S. 481, 490 (1987).
91. This should include wells approved by a tribe that has taken primacy for the
underground injection control program, see 42 U.S.C. § 300h-300h-1 (1994), and wells on
Indian lands approved by the EPA under its retained authority. See id. § 300h-1(e). See
generally infra Section III.B.
92. Under the CWA, "pollutant" does not mean:
water, gas, or other material which is injected into a well to facilitate
production of oil or gas, or water derived in association with oil or gas
production and disposed of in a well, if the well used either to facilitate
production or for disposal purposes is approved by authority of the State
in which the well is located, and if such State determines that such injection
or disposal will not result in the degradation of ground or surface water
resources.
CWA § 502(6)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6)(B) (1994).
93. CWA § 1342()(2), 33 U.S.C. § 13421)(2) (1994). Under this section, the EPA may not
require, or "directly or indirectly require any State to require" a NPDES permit, so long as
the stormwater runoff is "composed entirely" of runoff from point sources "used for
collecting and conveying precipitation runoff and which are not contaminated by contact
with, or do not come into contact with, any overburden, raw material, intermediate
products, finished product, byproduct, or waste products located on the site of such
operations."
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importantly, with respect to onshore facilities," EPA regulations provide
that there shall be "no discharge of waste water pollutants into navigable
waters from any source" associated with oil and gas operations." To
implement those regulations, the EPA has issued a general NPDES permit
covering onshore oil and gas extraction point sources in four states with
significant oil and gas development of Indian lands.' This general permit,
like the regulations, unconditionally prohibits the discharge into navigable
waters of all waters and wastes resulting from oil and gas activities.'
Because oil and gas wastes may not be discharged into the navigable
waters, tribal WQS do not offer tribes any direct control over the disposal
of oil and gas wastes.
Nonetheless, tribal water quality standards may still impact oil and
gas activities in a number of significant ways. For example, congressional
policy provides that no discharges of oil should be permitted into the
navigable waters." Section 311 of the Clean Water Act prohibits the
discharge of oil in quantities that may be harmful to public health or welfare
or the environment." The EPA has, in turn, determined that a discharge is
of sufficient quantity to be harmful if it violates applicable water quality
standards.!' Consequently, a discharge of oil of any kind into the navigable
waters which violates applicable tribal WQS is a violation of the Clean
Water Act.
In addition, oil and gas operations are subject to a general federal
permit for storm water discharges. In 1992, the EPA issued a final NPDES
permit for storm water discharges associated with industrial activity, a
permit which applies to Indian lands in 21 states."° Facilities engaged in
94. Most oil and gas operationd on Indian lands will fall into the onshore category.
Onshore facilities are defined as those "engaged in the production, field exploration, drilling,
well completion and well treatment in the oil and gas extraction industry which are located
landward of the inner boundary of the territorial sea." Oil and Gas Extraction Point Source
Category, 40 C.F.R. § 435.30 (1996).
95. 40 C.F.L § 435.32 (emphasis added).
96. See Final WPDES General Permits for the Oil and Gas Extraction Point Source
Category, Onshore Subcategory-States of Louisana (LAG320000), New Mexico
(NMG320000), Oklahoma (OKG320000), and Texas (TXG320000), 56 Fed. Reg. 7698 (1991).
97. Id. at 7703.
98. CWA § 311(b)(1), 33 U.S.C § 1321(b)(1) (1994). Section 311 defines oil as "including,
but not limited to, petroleum, fuel oil, sludge, oil refuse, and oil mixed with wastes other
than dredged spoil." Id. § 311(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(a)(1).
99. Id. § 311(b)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(3).
100. Discharge of Oil, 40 C.F.R. § 110.3(a) (1996). The statutory authority for a regulatory
determination of the harmful quantity threshold is found at CWA § 311(b)(4), 33 U.S.C. §
1321(b)(4).
101. Final WPDES General Permits for Storm Water Discharges Associated with
Individual Activity, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,236 (1992). Indian lands are covered in the following
states: Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Louisiana, Maine,
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"industrial activity" for purposes of the general permit include oil and gas
exploration, production, processing, and treatment operations.' Although
the permit generally authorizes the discharge of uncontaminated storm
water upon submission of a notice of intent, a storm water discharge is not
covered if it is contributing or may reasonably be expected to contribute to
a violation of water quality standards." Thus, the discharge of storm
waters from oil and gas facilities is only authorized if the discharge will not
violate applicable tribal WQS." +
Tribal water quality standards may also be applicable in cases of
contamination resulting from oil and gas operations. For example, to the
extent that the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act (CERCLA) applies to the clean up of oil and gas
contamination," s clean up must ensure compliance with all applicable or
relevant and appropriate requirements (ARARs) of federal and state
environmental laws."° Tribal WQS under section 303 of the Clean Water
Massachusetts, Mississippi, Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Nevada, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming.
102. Id. at 41,320.
103. Id. at 41,239-40.
104. Nonetheless, the EPA recently issued an interim policy statement providing that
water quality-based effluent limitations will not apply to stormwater discharge permits. See
Water Pollution: Numeric, Water Quality Based Effluent Limits Do Not Apply to Storm
Water Permits, EPA Says, 27 Env't Rep. (BNA) 840 (Aug. 9,1996).
105. CERCLA by its plain language excludes liability for the release of "petroleum,
including crude oil or any fraction thereof which is not otherwise specifically listed or
designated as a hazardous substance" under CERCLA and for "natural gas, natural gas
liquids, liquefied natural gas, or synthetic gas usable for fuel (or mixtures of natural gas and
such synthetic gas)." CERCLA § 101(14), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1994). In addition, CERCLA
appears to exclude liability for any hazardous waste which would be exempt under the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). See CERCLA § 101(14)(C), 42 U.S.C. §
9601(14)(C). RCRA, in turn, excepts "drilling fluids, produced waters, and other wastes
associated with the exploration, development, or production of crude oil or natural gas"
from identification as hazardous wastes. RCRA § 3001(b)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 6921(b)(2)(A)
(1994). Nonetheless, if the waste exempt from hazardous waste regulation under RCRA falls
within one of the other definitions of hazardous substance in CERCLA, see 42 U.S.C. §
9601(14), CERCLA liability will generally attach for its release. See, e.g., Eagle-Picher
Industries v. EPA, 759 F.2d 922, 926-29 (D.C. Cir. 1985). See generally Daniel L. McKay,
RCRA's Oil Field Wastes Exemption and CERCLA's Petroleum Exclusion: Are They Justified?, 15
J. ENERGY NAT. REsouRCEs & ENvTL. L. 41 (1995); Patricia M. Botsko, Overview of
Environmental Regulations of Hazardous Substances in the Oil Patch, in ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION OF THE OIL AND GAs INDUSTRY (Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Found. 1993).
106. CERCLA § 121(d), 42 U.S.C. § 9621(d)(2)(A) (1994).
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Act should be considered an ARAR, thus ensuring that CERCLA clean up
efforts attain tribally-determined standards of water quality."
Moreover, tribes may recover natural resources damages under
both CERCLA and the Oil Pollution Act." Natural resources are defined as
"land, fish, wildlife, biota, air, water, ground water, drinking water
supplies, and other such resources,"' 9 a definition which certainly
encompasses the surface waters of Indian country. Thus tribes may recover
natural resources damages for injury to surface waters resulting from a
release of oil or hazardous substances."' Injury occurs if the oil or
hazardous substance causes a violation of applicable water quality
standards.' Consequently, oil companies may be liable for natural
resources damages to tribes if a release of oil or hazardous substances
results in a violation of tribal WQS.
Tribal WQS thus affect oil and gas exploration and production
activities in a number of ways. Because those effects are limited, however,
tribal environmental regulation of surface water resources impacted by oil
107. Grijalva, supra note 55, at 470. CERCLA appears to provide, however, that WQS are
not automatically ARARs, but rather that the determination is made on a case by case basis.
See 42 U.S.C. § 9621(d)(2)(B)(i).
108. The CERCLA natural resources liability provision is found at section 107(f), 42
U.S.C. § 9607(f) (1994) (providing for liability to an Indian tribe for "injury to, destruction
of, or loss of natural resources... belonging to, managed by, controlled by, or appertaining
to" the tribe or held in trust for the tribe or its members). The OPA provision is found at
section 1006(a)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 2706(a)(3) (1994) (providing for liability to an Indian tribe for
damages to natural resources "belonging to, managed by, controlled by, or appertaining to"
the tribe). See generally Rachel Jacobson & Peter Monson, Natural Resource Damages: Tribes as
Trustees, in 5TH ANNUAL CONFEREN CE ON NATuRAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT AND
ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCMENT ON INDIAN LANDS (ABA SONREEL 1993).
109. CERCLA § 101(16), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(16); OPA § 1001(20), 33 U.S.C. § 2701(20) (1994).
110. Liability under CERCLA is for the release or threatened release of a hazardous
substance. CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). As already noted, the definition of
hazardous substance expressly excludes "petroleum, including crude oil or any fraction
thereof," as well as natural gas. See supra note 105.
Liability under the OPA is for the discharge or the substantial threat of a discharge of oil
into or upon the navigable waters. OPA § 1002(a), 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (1994). Oil is defined
as "oil of any kind or in any form, including, but not limited to, petroleum, fuel oil, sludge,
oil refuse, and oil mixed with wastes other than dredged spoil," but specifically excludes any
kind of oil that is covered as a hazardous substance under CERCLA. Id. § 1001(23), 33 U.S.C.
§ 2701(23).
The OPA establishes a scheme "to fill the void created by CERCLA's petroleum
exclusion." David E. Pierce, Regulating Surface Water Impacts Associated with Exploration,
Development, Production, and Transportation, in ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION OF THE OIL AND
GAS INDUsRY 4-28 (Rocky Mtn. Min. L Found. 1993). The two statutes together offer wide-
ranging, but not comprehensive, protection. A release of natural gas, or a release of oil that
is not into the navigable waters, but which injures natural resources, generally escapes
liability.
111. Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 43 C.F.R. § 11.62(b)-(c) (1996).
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and gas development is largely indirect. But direct tribal environmental
regulation of oil and gas companies operating in Indian country is a short
step away.
B. Tribal Control of Environmental Programs
Tribal WQS programs represent the first wave of tribal primacy
under the federal environmental laws. Some tribes will doubtless refrain
from taking primacy under any of the available environmental programs,
and few tribes will likely have the resources-human, financial, or
technical-to take primacy under all the available programs.'12 But many
tribes will certainly seek primacy under a number of the environmental
programs.
Initially, however, tribes may carefully choose which programs to
pursue, focusing limited resources on priority problems."' And if tribes
with limited resources are turning first to water quality issues of immediate
concern, regulation of oil and gas activities may soon take precedence for
some tribes. Exploration, production, and disposal activities of oil
companies can have devastating effects on tribal water resources.
Perhaps the clearest example is the groundwater of the Sac and Fox
Nation."4 Since 1924, the Tenneco Oil Company has engaged in oil and gas
activities on Sac and Fox tribal lands,"5 eventually leasing 760 acres of the
112. For tribes that do not take primacy, the EPA retains the authority to administer the
environmental programs in Indian country. See EPA CoNCEPT PAPMR, supra note 36, at 3-4.
113. A 1994 survey posited that tribes are generally responding to particular water
quality issues and "picking their spots" to seek TAS. WATER QUALITY SURVEY, supra note 52,
at 53. The survey continues: "This may suggest a lack of comprehensive water quality
planning; the Tribes may be primarily responding to existing problems rather than
preventing them. However, given that Tribal funds usually are sparse and federal funds are
extremely limited, the Tribes have little choice but to prioritize water quality issues and
address only the most serious." Id.
114. Several of the statements in the discussion that follows are supported by allegations
of the Tenneco Complaint, supra note 3. For purposes of this narrative, all allegations of the
complaint will be accepted as true. Nonetheless, Tenneco has denied certain factual
allegations of the complaint, as well as all liability. See United States v. Tenneco Oil Co.,
Proposed Consent Decree and Final Judgment Among the United States of America and the
Sac and Fox Nation and Tenneco Oil Co. at 9, No. CIV-96-017-C (W.D. Okla.) [hereinafter
Tenneco Decree]. The settlement agreement provides that the parties "do not admit any
allegation, finding, determination or conclusion contained in the litigation, nor do they admit
liability for any purpose or admit any issues of law or fact or any responsibility for the
contamination at the tribal lands." Id. 13.
115. Prior to 1965, oil and gas activities on Sac and Fox lands were conducted by the H.F.
Wilcox Oil and Gas Company and its predecessor in interest, J.C. Cooke Oil and Gas
Company. Tenneco Complaint, supra note 3, at 3-4. Wilcox Oil merged into Tenneco on
September 7,1965, and Tenneco assumed all the liabilities and obligations of Wilcox. Id. at
[Vol. 37
Spring 1997] OIL AND WATER IN INDIAN COUNTRY
tribe's 880 acres of trust lands.16 Under its leases, Tenneco engaged in
exploration and production of oil and gas, including secondary recovery
and the disposal of oilfield wastes.117 Over the years, Tenneco Oil injected
some sixty three million barrels of salt water under fewer than 800 acres of
land,'18 contaminating the aquifer and leaving the Nation without a source
of fresh drinking water.
The Sac and Fox lands overlie the Vamoosa-Ada aquifer.' This
freshwater aquifer, the only natural source of drinking water on or under
the Sac and Fox tribal lands, lies between 25 and 250 feet underground.'
After World War II, when oil production on Sac and Fox lands declined,
Tenneco began secondary recovery operations, injecting produced water
into some of the wells at a depth of about 3000 feet0'2 Because the Vamoosa-
4. At some time subsequent to 1986, Mesa Midcontinent Limited Partnership and James Q.
Maguire, Jr. and J.Q. Maguire apparently became successors in interest to all or part of
Tenneco Oil. Id. at 8-9. In mid-December 1996, Tenneco Oil Company was purchased by El
Paso Natural Gas Company. El Paso Natural Gas Unit Settles Pollution Charges for $3.5 Million,
DALLAS MORNING NEws, Dec. 24,1996, at 13D. In this narrative, "Tenneco" will be used to
refer to the Tenneco Oil Company and its predecessors and successors in interest on the Sac
and Fox tribal lands. Tenneco no longer holds any leases on Sac and Fox tribal lands.
Tenneco Decree, supra note 114, at 15.
116. In 1867, after nearly eight decades of forced migrations, the Sac and Fox located on
a reservation in the Indian Territory comprised of almost 480,000 acres. Treaty with the Sauk
and Foxes, Feb. 18,1867,15 Stat. 495; MuRIL H. WRIGHT, A GUIDE TO THE INDIAN TRIBES OF
OKLAHOMA 226 (1986). Within a generation, the Sac and Fox accepted allotment of tribal
lands in severalty and cession of the remaining lands to the United States. Act of February
13, 1891, ch. 165, 26 Stat. 749 (1891). Nonetheless, the Nation retained approximately 880
acres, the seat of the Sac and Fox Agency, as tribal trust lands. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Sac
and Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114, 118 (1993) (referencing 800 acres reserved under the 1891
Agreement); Tenneco Complaint, supra note 3, at 3 (referencing 880 acres currently held in
trust, plus an additional 80 acres held in fee by the Nation subject to a restriction on
alienation). These tribal trust lands are Sac and Fox Indian country, Sac and Fox, 508 U.S. at
125, and today house the tribal headquarters, a health clinic, the national library, a food
distribution warehouse, a campground, a rodeo ground, and an RV and mobile home park.
Hearings, supra note 5, at 107 (prepared testimony of Elmer Manatowa, Chief, Sac and Fox
Nation).
In 1935, Tenneco entered into an oil and gas lease for approximately 720 acres, Tenneco
Complaint, supra note 3, at 3, and in 1949, a second lease for an additional 40 acres of tribal
lands. Id. at 4.
117. Id. at 5.
118. FINAL REPORT AND LEGisIATWE RECOMMBNDAnONS A REPORT OF THE SPECLAL COMM.
ON INVESFIGATIONS OF THE SENATE SELECT COMM. ON INDIAN AFFAIRS, 132 (1989) [hereinafter
REPORT].
119. Tenneco Complaint, supra note 3, at 4.
120. Hearings, supra note 5, at 31 (statement of Curtis Canard, Tribal Geotechnical
Services, Inc., consultant to the Sac and Fox Nation). See also REPORT, supra note 118, at 132-
33.
121. Hearings, supra note 5, at 31-32; REPORT, supra note 118, at 132.
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Ada aquifer is a "leaking bucket," the salt water migrated into the shallower
freshwater aquifer and into some abandoned oil wells."
Prior to 1948, the Vamoosa-Ada aquifer provided a source of fresh
drinking water for the Sac and Fox lands. In the early 1950s, however, tribal
members began to complain about the quality of the water." Water from
a well drilled in 1964 failed the drinking water guidelines of the U.S. Health
Service.'24 A long series of studies followed, each arriving at similar
conclusions:" the aquifer under Sac and Fox lands is contaminated with
benzene, sodium, chloride, and sulfates; the contamination is the result
of exploration, production, and disposal activities by the oil companies;2W
and the contamination is extensive and "beyond rehabilitation.""a The
aquifer which served as the fresh drinking water supply for the Sac and Fox
before World War II is now unusable.
There is no supply of drinking water remaining anywhere on Sac
and Fox tribal lands. All drinking water must now be brought in from
outside the reservation. Off-reservation wells supply tribal drinking
water,'2 and the Nation has recently entered into a temporary contract with
a nearby city to supply water,' but both sources are inadequate for tribal
needs. Without a permanent and adequate supply of drinking water,
commercial development of the Nation's lands has been essentially
suspended.'
In June 1997, Tenneco, the Sac and Fox Nation, and the federal
government entered into a settlement agreement to rectify the drinking
122. Hearings, supra note 5, at 32.
123. Id. at 31.
124. Id.
125. The studies included a regional study by the US. Geological Survey in 1978;
technical studies by the Bureau of Indian Affairs in 1979; a surface water study by the BIA
in 1980; additional studies in 1982 and 1984; and an analysis by the EPA Office of Drinking
Water in 1986. Id. at 32-33.
126. Tenneco Complaint, supra note 3, at 7-8; Hearings, supra note 5, at 32.
127. Hearings, supra note 5 at 32-33; see also REPORT, supra note 118, at 132.
128. Hearings, supra note 5, at 33.
129. In the 1970s, the Indian Health Service located a fresh water supply two miles south
of the Sac and Fox country and drilled two wells. Id. at 31.
130. Tenneco Complaint, supra note 3, at 7.
131. Hearings, supra note 5, at 36 (statement of G. William Rice, Attorney General, Sac and
Fox Nation), 37 (statement of Truman Carter, Treasurer, Sac and Fox Nation). Sac and Fox
industries have been located from 30 to 150 miles from the tribal lands. Id. at 37-38
(statement of Truman Carter), 107 (prepared testimony of Chief Elmer Manatowa). On
occasion, the Nation has even been forced, during interruptions in the off-reservation well
water supply, to make portable outhouses available to employees and visitors to Sac and Fox
lands. Id. at 38 (statement of Truman Carter).
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water problems of the Nation.l32 Tenneco agreed to a total settlement of $3.5
million," including $1.16 million in direct payments to the Sac and Fox
Nation." In addition to the payments, Tenneco will purchase three tracts
of land as sources of potable water, 3 drill supply wells, construct treatment
systems, and lay pipeline."3 Tenneco's ultimate obligation is to provide a
potable water supply of at least 207 sustainable gallons per minute from the
tracts it purchases!' 7 This drinking water supply will allow the Sac and Fox
Nation, "'for the first time in 40 years," to go forward with economic
development of its reservation." In Sac and Fox country, development
plans are already underway: the Nation intends to open a juvenile detention
facility in 1997, and is planning a health clinic and apartments for elderly
tribal members.13
The consent decree with Tenneco will thus bring the Sac and Fox
Nation an adequate supply of safe drinking water and permit long-
suspended use of tribal lands. But the decree will do nothing to restore the
Vamoosa-Ada aquifer. While the settlement will provide enormous benefits
to the Nation, preventing the contamination of the groundwater in the first
place would have saved decades of struggle and lost opportunities.
Adequate regulation of Tenneco's activities could perhaps have
prevented the destruction of the Sac and Fox aquifer, but federal
enforcement of environmental laws has been lax in Indian country140 and
132. See Tenneco Decree, supra note 114. The settlement agreement was reached in mid-
December 1996, and the consent decree was published in the Federal Register on February
6,1997. Notice of Lodging of Consent Decree, United States v. Tenneco Oil Co., 62 Fed. Reg.
5654 (1997). Following an extended comment period, the district court entered the decree on
June 2, 1997. Conversation with Kalyn Cherie Free, U.S. Department of Justice, in Tulsa,
Oklahoma (June 8,1997).
133. Bill Swindell, Oil Firm, Tribe Settle Lawsuit, TULSA WORLD, Dec. 24,1996, at All.
134. Tenneco Decree, supra note 114, at 24-25. The payments and other conditions of
the settlement will be implemented in three phases. Of the initial payment of $580,000, at
least $75,000 will be dedicated to cleanup of oilfield debris, removal of abandoned oilfield
equipment, and cleanup and maintenance of producing oil wells. Id. 1 24.
135. The three tracts must comprise a minimum of 120 acres. Id. 18D. The tracts will be
conveyed to the Sac and Fox Nation, which will petition the Department of the Interior to
take the lands into trust. Id. 18F.
136. Id. 18A-B. Tenneco also agreed to: install a water intake structure and pump on
the Deep Fork River for future tribal use, id. 18G; remove a surface impoundment, id. 19;
and contract with a nursery to plant 250 pecan trees on tribal land, id. 20.
137. Id. 18C.
138. Swindell, supra note 133, at All (quoting Dora Young, Principal Chief of the Sac and
Fox Nation).
139. Id. Phase I of the settlement calls for Tenneco to provide potable water sufficient to
allow the juvenile detention center to open. Tenneco Decree, supra note 114, at 18A.
140. There was little regulation of underground injection activity anywhere until 1965,
see Catherine Vandemoer, The Development of Underground Injection Control Programs on Indian
Lands: Issues, Challenges, and a Blueprint for Tribal Program Development, in MINERAL
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the Nation itself lacked the resources and the information to act."4 The
lesson for other tribes is clear:42 effective protection of water resources from
the impacts of oil and gas operations may depend upon tribal
environmental programs.
The federal water program with the most immediate and direct
impact on the oil and gas industry is the underground injection control
(UIC) program of the SDWA.' 0 As illustrated by the Sac and Fox
experience, underground injection has dual importance in the oil and gas
context. First, once the natural pressure in a reservoir has dropped,
companies may inject produced water or gas into the oil reservoir to force
the remaining oil into production wells.'" Second, because oilfield waste
water may not be discharged to surface waters, the primary method of
disposal is by injection into wells.4'
The UIC program is intended to prevent underground injection that
could endanger existing or potential underground drinking water
sources.' Regulation is accomplished by imposing construction, operating,
DEVELOPMENT ON INDIAN LANDS 17-2 (Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Found. 1989), and no federal
program covering Indian lands until 1988. See Underground Injection Control Programs on
Indian Lands, 53 Fed. Reg. 43,084, 43,096 (1988) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 147).
Moreover, the mere existence of a federal program does not guarantee that it is adequately
enforced. See, e.g., WATER QUALITY SURVEY, supra note 52, at 66 (noting the lack of "reliable
indications that the EPA itself is administering and enforcing the Clean Water Act on those
reservations where the Tribal governments are not).
141. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 5, at 41-44 (statement of G. William Rice) (noting the
tribal reliance on the Department of the Interior to monitor oil lessees, and the lack of tribal
resources to force the Department to act). In addition, of course, Tenneco's activities on the
Sac and Fox Reservation took place long before the Water Acts authorized tribes to take
primacy.
142. See Vandemoer, supra note 140, at 17-23 (noting "newly discovered ground water
contamination" on a number of reservations, including the Navajo, Jicarilla Apache, Wind
River, Southern Ute, and Osage).
143. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300h, et. seq. (1994 & Supp. 11995); see generally Elizabeth H. Temkin &
Mary C. Larson, Overview of Federal Underground Injection Control Program, in ENVIRON-
MENTAL REGULATION OF THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY (Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Found. 1993).
Nonetheless, the SDWA expressly prohibits the EPA from requiring, or requiring the states
to require in state-operated UIC programs, provisions which "interfere with or impede"
either underground injection of produced water or underground injection for secondary
recovery of oil or gas, unless necessary to protect underground sources of drinking water.
Identical language appears at 42 US.C. § 300h(b)(2) (regulations for state programs), § 300h-
1(c) (EPA program for states without primacy) (1994). Nothing, however, would prohibit a
state or a tribe from choosing to impose such requirements. See 42 U.S.C. § 300h-2(d).
144. JOHNS. LOWE, OIL AND GAS IN ANUTSHEL 7 (3d ed. 1995).
145. Marion Yoder & Thomas H. Owen, Jr., Disposal of Produced Water, 37 ROCKY MTN.
MIN. L. INsT. 21-1, 21-3 (1991).
146. 42 U.S.C. § 300h. There is an exemption for aquifers that "cannot now and will not
in the future serve as a source of drinking water" because of any one of a number of factors.
Underground Injection Control Program: Criteria and Standards, 40 C.F.R. § 146.4(b) (1996).
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and monitoring requirements on five classes of underground injection
wells; 47 Class II wells are those used for the injection of oilfield waste
waters, for enhanced oil and gas recovery, and for the storage of
hydrocarbons.' All underground injection activities, including
construction of the wells, require a permit from the appropriate
jurisdiction"'9
Thousands of Class II injection wells are located in Indian
country.' In the absence of a tribal UIC program, the EPA regulates these
and other injection wells on all "Indian lands," which are defined as all
lands within Indian country regardless of ownership."5' By regulation in
1988, the EPA extended the generic federal UIC program to Indian lands in
forty-one states that had taken primacy for non-Indian lands, 52 but retained
The Vamoosa-Ada aquifer underlying the Sac and Fox Reservation, for example, may be
exempt under the criterion that the aquifer is so contaminated that it is economically or
technologically impractical to make it fit for human consumption. See id. § 146.4(b)(3).
Although a number of aquifer exemptions were granted in Indian country, one commentator
contends that the exemptions were based on a poor understanding of local conditions and
were designed to streamline the administrative burden. Vandemoer, supra note 140, at 17-10.
Nonetheless, tribes may wish to regulate underground injection even if it will no longer
protect groundwater quality. Id. at 17-18.
147. 40 C.F.R. § 144.6 (1996).
148. Id. § 144.6(b), § 146.5(b). The criteria and standards for Class II wells are found at 40
C.F.R. § 146.21-.24.
Class I wells are used to inject hazardous, nonhazardous, and municipal wastes below the
lowermost aquifer. Class III wells are used to inject fluids for the extraction of minerals.
Class IV wells are used to inject radioactive or hazardous wastes into or above the lowermost
aquifer. Class V wells include all injection wells that do not fall into the other four categories.
Vandemoer, supra note 140, at 17-12, Temkin & Larson, supra note 143, at 6-2-6-4; see generally
40 C.F.R. pt. 146.
149. 42 U.S.C. § 300h(b)(1) (1994); 40 C.F.R. § 144.31. Under certain circumstances,
existing wells-including existing Class II wells-can be authorized by rule rather than by
individual permit. See 40 C.F.R. § 144.21-.28.
150. For example, there are some 3600 Class I wells on the Osage mineral reserve alone.
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. EPA, 803 F.2d 545,562 (10th Cir. 1986). In 1988, the EPA found that
there were 704 Class II wells on Navajo lands, 15 on Ute Mountain Ute lands, and 194 on
Indian lands in Oklahoma other than those of the Osage and Five Civilized Tribes, see
Underground Injection Control Programs for Certain Indian Lands, 53 Fed. Reg. 43,096,
43,097 (1988) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 147), and 200 on the Wind River Reservation. See
Underground Injection Control Programs on Indian Lands, 53 Fed. Reg. 43,084,43,085 (1988).
A 1989 inventory found a total of 10,116 Class II wells on Indian lands in Colorado,
Wyoming, North and South Dakota, Montana, and Utah. See Vandemoer, supra note 140, at
17-12.
151. See 40 C.F.R. § 144.3 (-Indian lands means 'Indian country' as defined in 18 U.S.C.
1151"); see also id. § 144.2. The EPA's authority to regulate on Indian lands absent a tribal
program is now recognized in the SDWA. 42 U.S.C. § 300h-l(e); see also Phillips Petroleum, 803
F.2d at 557.
152. 53 Fed. Reg. 43,084 (1988); see generally 40 C.F.R. pt. 147 (1996).
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authority to promulgate specialized federal Class II programs for Indian
lands that are tailored to tribal concerns." Under this authority, and at the
request of the affected tribes, the EPA promulgated tailored programs for
certain tribes, primarily located in Oklahoma and New Mexico.'s" For the
most part, these tailored programs incorporate selected aspects of the state
programs that are more conservative and thus more protective than the
generic federal standards.'" '
Indian tribes are authorized to take primacy for the UIC program.'
To date, at least one tribe has applied for TAS for the UIC program, 5 7 and
several tribes have indicated their intent to seek UIC primacy." No tribe,
however, has apparently yet been granted primacy by the EPA.
Tribes concerned about the impacts of underground injection into
Class II wells thus have two regulatory options. Tribes may pursue a federal
UIC program tailored to local needs,' or they may seek primacy to
administer the UIC program. The tailored program alternative may be an
expedient compromise for tribes with specialized needs and concerns, but
without adequate resources to assume primacy, or for whom groundwater
is not a sufficiently high priority. It may also be a useful step between
federal implementation of the generic UIC program and the development
of a tribal program, allowing the tribe time to develop the necessary
resources and expertise to seek primacy. Nonetheless, the tailored programs
are comprised largely of the generic UIC program provisions, and they are
153. 40 C.F.R. § 144.2 (1996). The EPA had exercised this authority some years before the
Indian amendments to the SDWA, promulgating a particularized Class II UIC program for
the Osage mineral reserve in 1984. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 147 subpt. GGG (1996). The EPA's
authority to do so was upheld by the Tenth Circuit in Phillips Petroleum, 803 F.2d 545.
154. 40 C.F.R. pt. 147. The EPA promulgated two sets of specialized UIC regulations. One
set applied to all lands of the Navajo Nation and the Ute Mountain Ute Tribe, as well as to
all other Indian lands in New Mexico. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 147 subpt. HHH. The second set
applied to all Indian lands in Oklahoma, except for Class II wells on the Osage reserve and
the lands of the Five Civilized Tribes. See id. subpt. II.
155. 53 Fed. Reg. 43,096,43,102 (1988) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 147).
156. 42 U.S.C. § 300h-l(e) (1994), § 300j-11(a)(2); see also 40 C.F.R. § 144.72.
157. The Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa has applied for UIC primacy. WATER QUALrY
SURVEY, supra note 52, app. 2 at 11. In addition, the Navajo Nation had an application to
assume UIC primacy pending before the EPA as of 1994. Susan R. Stockstill & Lynn H. Slade,
Oil and Gas Development on Indian Lands: Shiffing Sovereigntes in the Oil Patch, 45TH OIL & GAS
INST. 10-1, 10-56 (Matthew Bender 1994).
158. See Vandemoer, supra note 140, at 17-14-17-16 (discussing program developments
of the Wind River, Ute Mountain Ute, and Navajo Tribes).
159. The EPA noted that '[m]odified programs may be developed for other Indian lands
in the future at the request of the Tribe.' Underground Injection Control Programs on Indian
Lands, 53 Fed. Reg. 43,084, at 43,084 (1988) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 147). Apparently,
however, no tribe has done so, and some of the tribes with tailored programs may now be
pursuing UIC primacy.
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administered by the EPA. Tribes that wish to exercise direct control over
UIC activities, and thus over the impacts of oil and gas development on
their water resources, will choose instead to pursue primacy to administer
the UIC program within their territories.
C. Respecting Tribal Government
Beyond the specific ways in which tribal WQS will impact oil and
gas companies, and beyond the potential for future direct tribal regulation
of on-reservation oil and gas activities, lies a broader lesson: Indian tribes
are governments with authority over their territories and persons who
operate within them. Tribes exercise all powers of sovereignty that have not
been divested,"W including authority "over both their members and their
territory."161 Under this inherent sovereignty, tribes retain virtually plenary
power to regulate Indian activities and Indian lands,62 including the
conduct of non-Indians that occurs on Indian lands." Moreover, even on
fee lands tribes have inherent authority to regulate non-Indians "who enter
into consensual relationships with the tribe or its members"'" or whose
conduct directly affects tribal sovereign interests. The Supreme Court has
specifically recognized that tribal authority over non-Indians includes the
right to tax, license, or otherwise regulate non-Indians who enter into such
commercial dealings as "contracts, leases, or other arrangements." 1"
Although these principles should not be new ones for oil
companies, the industry has a rocky history of accepting the exercise of
governmental powers by Indian tribes. 67 Thus far, the most contentious
issues have been those of taxation and tribal court jurisdiction.
160. See supra text accompanying notes 10-24.
161. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975); see also Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S.
217, 220 (1959) (tribes retain the inherent right 'to make their own laws and be ruled by
them").
162. Brendale v. Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408,444 (1989) (Stevens, J.); New Mexico
v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324,332 (1983).
163. See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 147 (1982) (noting that a
"nonmember's presence and conduct on Indian lands are conditioned by the limitations the
tribe may choose to impose'); sec also Mescalero Apache, 462 U.S. at 330-31; Montana v.
United States, 450 U.S. 544, 557 (1981).
164. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565.
165. Id. at 566. This aspect of inherent tribal authority is explored supra at text
accompanying notes 16-24.
166. Id. at 565.
167. I do not necessarily mean to single out the oil companies as unique in this regard.
Resource extraction industries generally have a history of challenging tribal governmental
powers.
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Taxation is a basic power of any sovereign, and taxation of natural
resource wealth through severance, income, and property taxes is a long-
standing practice.6ee Like other governments, tribes have used resource-
based taxes as a means of enhancing governmental revenues and regulating
the activities of the resource extraction companies."es Federal recognition of
inherent tribal authority to tax within Indian country dates back at least to
the late nineteenth century.' 7 In 1904, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the
right of tribes to tax non-Indians who were exploiting the natural resources
of the tribal territory."7'
Nonetheless, when the Jicarilla Apache Tribe imposed an oil and
gas severance tax in 1976, lessees of tribal lands sought to enjoin the tax on
the ground that the Tribe had not reserved the right to tax in the leases. In
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, the Supreme Court upheld the tribe's
inherent sovereign power to tax nonmembers of the tribe that do business
in Indian country."7 Because the oil and gas lessees availed themselves of
the privilege of conducting business on the Jicarilla Reservation and
benefited from the provision of tribal services funded by governmental
revenues, the severance tax was properly imposed on them.' The
companies" argument that the tribal tax was not valid once a lease was final,
the Court noted, confused the tribe's dual roles as mineral owner and as
government.74 An Indian tribe does not abandon its sovereign powers by
failing to reserve them in a commercial contract, and the lessees thus remain
168. See Ronald A. Kaiser & James E. Fletcher, State Policies and Practices in Coal Severance
Taxation, 27 NAT. REsoURCESJ. 591,595-97 (1987); Denise DiPasquale, et al., Natural Resource
Taxation, 29 AM. U. L REV. 281 (1980); Rita Neumann, Taxation of Natural Resource Production
on Tribal Lands, 63 TAXES 813 (1985).
169. AMBLER, supra note 2, at 196-99; Merrion v. Jicarilia Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 137
(1982). On tribal taxation of mineral producers, see generally Royster, supra note 1, at 606-11.
170. See Crabtree v. Madden, 54 Fed. 426,429 (8th Cir. Indian Terr. 1893). In addition to
this judicial recognition, the power to tax was affirmed by the Department of the Interior in
the 1930s, see Powers ofIndian Tribes, 55 Interior Dec. 14, 46-48 (1934), reprinted in I Op. Solic.
Interior Relating to Indian Affairs 1917-1974, at 445, 465-66, and by a congressionally-
appointed commission in the 1970s. See AMERICAN INDIAN POuCY RuviEw COMMLmION, FINAL
REPORT: TASK FORCE TWo: TRIBAL GOVERNMEN 310 (1976).
171. Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U.S. 384, 393 (1904) (tax on livestock grazing by non-
Indians); see also Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 231 F.2d 89,99 (8th Cir. 1956) (same).
172. Merrion, 455 U.S. at 137-38. Three years later, the Court reaffirmed that tribal
authority to tax is an inherent sovereign power. Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe of
Indians, 471 U.S. 195 (1985). Moreover, the principle that tribes retain inherent authority to
tax non-Indian companies doing business in Indian country had been recognized twice by
the Supreme Court in the two years prior to the Merrion decision. See Washington v.
Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 152 (1980); Montana
v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981).
173. Merrion, 455 U.S. at 137-38,140-42.
174. Id. at 145.
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subject to subsequent governmental action such as the levy of severance
taxes.17
Taxation remains an area in which oil and gas companies continue
to challenge tribal authority. After Merrion, the oil and gas industry
generally accepted tribal taxation of oil leases on tribal lands, but recently
the companies have challenged tribal authority to impose taxes on other
lands.176 The Tenth Circuit held in Mustang Production Company v. Harrison,
however, that tribes have the authority to impose taxes, including taxes on
oil and gas production, on lands within tribal jurisdiction.17 And lands
within tribal jurisdiction, the court found, extend to the Indian country,'"
including not only reservations, but also trust allotments located outside the,
boundaries of any formal reservation.' The courts' approach has thus
remained consistent since Merrion: tribes have authority to tax activities
which take place within the tribes' Indian country.
In the context of these recent challenges to tribal taxing authority,
the oil companies have also challenged, directly or indirectly, the
jurisdiction of tribal courts. An oil and gas company contesting tribal taxes
or other regulations must bring suit in the proper forum. And that forum,
recent cases maintain, is the tribal courts.
The doctrine of exhaustion of tribal remedies is traceable to National
Farmers Union Insurance Co. v. Crow Tribe. 8W In National Farmers, an insurer
175. Id. at 146-47. If, however, the sovereign expressly bargains away its sovereign power
to tax, the lease term would be binding.
176. See Texaco, Inc. v. Hale, 81 F.3d 934 (10th Cir. 1996) (oil company challenged oil and
gas severance tax and pipeline operator challenged business activity tax, both imposed on
activities outside reservation but on lands which companies had conceded were Navajo
Indian country); Duncan Energy Co. v. Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold
Reservation, 27 F.3d 1294 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1103 (1995) (oil company
challenged property and gross production taxes, as well as Indian preference in employment
law, as applied to lands leased from non-Indians within reservation boundaries). In both
cases, the federal lawsuits were dismissed for failure to exhaust tribal court remedies.
177. Mustang Production Co. v. Harrison, 94 F.3d 1382,1385 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied
sub nom. Mustang Fuel Corp. v. Hatch, 117 S. Ct. 1288 (1997) (Cheyenne-Arapaho oil and gas
severance tax).
178. For the statutory definition of Indian country, see supra note 30.
179. Mustang Production, 94 F.3d at 1385. See also Conoco, Inc. v. Arkeketa, 23 Indian L.
Rep. 3043 (W.D. Okla. 1996) (Ponca Tribe has authority to impose its oil and gas severance
tax on Conoco's leases of trust allotments); Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Co. v.
Watchman, 52 F.3d 1531,1542 n.11 (10th Cir. 1995) (Navajo Nation has authority to impose
business activities tax on source gains from that portion of off-reservation coal mine that lies
within Navajo trust allotments). In Watchman, the court also remanded for a determination
of whether the mine site, 47% of which is located on trust allotments, is a dependent Indian
community.
180. National Farmers Insurance Co. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845 (1985). Federal court
jurisdiction in National Farmers was based on federal question jurisdiction. In Iowa Mutual
Insurance Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987), the Court extended the tribal exhaustion
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brought suit in federal court to enjoin a tribal court default judgment. The
Supreme Court ruled that although a challenge to tribal court jurisdiction
presented a federal question, the issue of the tribal court's authority should
be heard and decided in the first instance by the tribal court. Exhaustion of
tribal remedies, the Court determined, would advance the federal policy of
tribal self-government, promote the orderly administration of justice, and
provide the federal courts with the benefits of tribal court expertise.'8'
Subsequent to National Farmers, the majority of circuits has
developed a rule that exhaustion is required whenever there is a "colorable"
or "plausible" assertion that tribal courts have jurisdiction in the case.182
Federal courts are thus generally required to dismiss or abstain in favor of
allowing the lawsuit to proceed in tribal court, even though the non-Indian
party can assert a proper basis for federal jurisdiction. Once tribal court
remedies have been exhausted, the losing party may seek review of the
tribal court's jurisdictional ruling in federal court."s But the authority to
hear the case in the first instance rests with the tribal forum.
doctrine to suits based on diversity as well.
The tribal exhaustion doctrine is an extraordinarily complex area of federal Indian law.
For discussions of the doctrine, see Timothy W. Joranko, Exhaustion of Tribal Remedies in the
Lower Courts After National Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual: Toward a Consistent Treatment of
Tribal Courts by the Federal Judicial System, 78 MNN. L REV. 259 (1993), and Laurie Reynolds,
Exhaustion of Tribal Remedies: Extolling Tribal Sovereignty While Expanding Federal Jurisdiction,
73 N.C. L. REV. 1089 (1995).
181. National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 856-57. The Court found, however, that exhaustion of
tribal remedies was not required if tribal jurisdiction was asserted in bad faith or with the
intent to harass, or was "patently violative of express jurisdictional prohibitions," or if
exhaustion would be futile because of a lack of tribal remedies to exhaust. Id. at 856 n.21.
182. Stock West Corp. v. Taylor, 964 F.2d 912, 919-20 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc). See
generally Joranko, supra note 180, at 268-87 for a circuit-by-circuit analysis.
The U.S. Supreme Court recently held, however, that exhaustion was not required in a
tort action between two non-Indians arising out of a traffic accident on a state highway
running through the reservations. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 117 S. Ct. 1404 (1996).
It is not always necessary that the exhaustion issue be raised by one of the parties. See
United States v. Tsosie, 92 F.3d 1037 (10th Cir. 1996) (affirming district court's sua sponte
dismissal to exhaust tribal remedies in a case that was essentially a dispute between two
tribal members as to their rights to land within Indian country).
183. National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 857; Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 19. The federal courts will
generally review questions of federal law de novo and the tribal court's findings of fact for
clear error. See Mustang Production, 94 F.3d at 1384; Duncan Energy Co. v. Three Affiliated
Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation, 27 F.3d 1294,1300 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513
U.S. 1103 (1995); FMC v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 905 F.2d 1311,1313-14 (9th Cir. 1990).
In theory, if the federal court affirms the tribal court's jurisdiction, the federal court is
"precluded" from relitigating the merits of the case. Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 19. Nonetheless,
as one court has noted recently, "National Farmers and Iowa Mutual both contemplate some
post-exhaustion review; however, the breadth of that review is as yet undefined." Nevada
v. Hicks, 944 F. Supp. 1455,1469 (D. Nev. 1996). See generally Judith V. Royster, Stature and
Scrutiny: Post-Exhaustion Review of Tribal Court Decisions, 46 KAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 1998).
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Nonetheless, oil and gas companies have resisted litigating in tribal
court. In case after case challenging tribal governmental authority to tax or
otherwise regulate, oil companies have filed suit in federal court. And in
every case involving the assertion of tribal authority within Indian
country,' the oil companies have been sent to tribal court to exhaust their
remedies.'s
The history of the Mustang Production litigation is illustrative of
challenges to both the tribal power to tax and the primacy of the tribal
courts. In 1988, the Cheyenne and Arapaho Tribes adopted an oil and gas
severance tax on production from any land "within the jurisdiction" of the
Tribes.86 Nineteen oil companies, whose leases included trust allotments,
filed suit in federal district court challenging the Tribes' authority to tax
production on allotted lands located outside the boundaries of a formal
reservation.'87 The Tribes moved for a stay or dismissal of the federal
lawsuit, and the federal district court, pursuant to National Farmers, stayed
184. In Watchman, the court determined that the tribal exhaustion doctrine "applies
throughout Indian country, not just on formal reservations." Nonetheless, the court noted
that although it would apply a bright-line rule requiring exhaustion inside reservation
boundaries, "the application of the doctrine may differ outside the formal boundaries of a
reservation." 52 F.3d at 1537. Outside reservations, the facts and circumstances of each case
are examined to determine whether the policies behind the National Farmers rule, see supra
text accompanying note 181, require abstention.
In Watchman, the Navajo Nation sought to apply its business activities tax to source gains
from a mine located outside, but adjacent to, the Navajo Reservation. The surface area of the
mine site was 47% trust allotments and 7% Navajo Nation lands, with the remainder owned
by private parties, the state, and the federal government. The coal estate was owned primar-
ily by the federal government and a private party; none of the subsurface coal was owned
by the tribe or its members. 52 F.3d at 1534-35. First, the court held that if the mine site was
Indian country, then the National Farmers factors required tribal exhaustion, in particular
because the lawsuit directly challenged the exercise of the tribe's sovereignty. Id. at 1537-39.
Second, the court held that the mine site was partly located in Indian country because 47%
of the surface area was trust allotments, id. at 1541, but that that interest "by itself is not
enough to trigger the tribal abstention doctrine." Id. at 1542. Accordingly, the court
remanded for a determination of whether the mine site was a dependent Indian community,
concluding that if it was, the district court should abstain in favor of the tribal court. Id.
185. See Texaco, Inc. v. Hale, 81 F.3d 934 (10th Cir. 1996) (exhaustion required for tribal
assertion of authority to tax oil and gas production on lands outside reservation that oil
companies conceded was within tribe's Indian country); Duncan Energy, 27 F.3d at 1294
(exhaustion required for tribal assertion of authority to tax oil and gas production on non-
Indian lands within reservation); Conoco, Inc. v. Arkeketa, 19 Indian L Rep. 3085 (N.D.
Okla. 1992) (exhaustion required for tribal assertion of authority to tax oil and gas
production on trust allotments); Conoco, Inc. v. Ponca Tax Comm'n, 21 Indian L. Rep. 6119
(Pon. Tax Ct. 1994) (subsequent proceeding in tribal court); Conoco, Inc. v. Arkeketa, 23
Indian L. Rep. 3043 (W.D. Okla. 1996) (proceeding on review in federal court).
186. Mustang Production, 94 F.3d at 1383.
187. Id. at 1384.
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the action pending exhaustion of tribal remedies." The companies then
filed suit in Cheyenne-Arapaho District Court.'" In 1991, the trial court
granted summary judgment to the Tribes,' and the companies appealed
to the Cheyenne-Arapaho Supreme Court. That court affirmed, holding that
trust allotments were within the civil jurisdiction of the Tribes and that the
oil companies availed themselves of doing business on "and taking valuable
resources from" Cheyenne-Arapaho lands." The oil companies sought
review in federal district court, which determined that the Cheyenne-
Arapaho Tribes properly exercised their jurisdiction to tax the lessees.w The
Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding, as did the Cheyenne-Arapaho courts, that
the Tribes' sovereign power to tax non-Indians doing business in the Tribes'
territory extended to the whole of the Tribes' Indian country, including its
members' trust allotments.'"
Indian tribes assert their governmental authority over oil and gas
operations for the same reasons as other governments. Tribal taxes are a
primary means of raising the revenue needed to provide basic
governmental services within the Indian country,"M and the tribal power to
tax "derives from the tribe's general authority, as sovereign, to control
economic activity within its jurisdiction."1 Nonetheless, oil companies
have appeared insistent on challenging every tribal attempt to exert their
taxing authority, and to bring those challenges in federal court. The
resulting extra step in litigation, the motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust
tribal remedies, forces tribes to expend their limited revenues on litigation
expenses that should not be incurred. The oil companies' historical failure
to respect tribal governmental authority and institutions, therefore, puts
tribes in a double bind. Not only must tribes defend against challenges to
their authority to collect revenues, but they must expend their revenues on
188. Id.
189. Initially, the companies filed an administrative appeal with the Cheyenne-Arapaho
Tax Commission, which ruled that it had no jurisdiction to determine the validity of an act
it was charged with enforcing. Mustang Production Co. v. Combs, No. 89-005 (Chey.-Arap.
Tax Comm'n, June 14,1989).
190. Mustang Fuel Corp. v. Cheyenne-Arapaho Tax Comm'n, 18 Indian L. Rep. 6095
(Chey.-Arap. Dist. Ct. 1991).
191. Mustang Fuel Corp. v. Cheyenne-Arapaho Tax Comm'n, 21 Indian L. Rep. 6058,
6065 (Chey-Arap. Sup. Ct. 1993).
192. Mustang Fuel Corp. v. Hatch, 890 F. Supp. 995 (W.D. Okla. 1995).
193. Mustang Production, 94 F.3d at 1382.
194. See Mustang Fuel Corp. v. Cheyenne-Arapaho Tax Comm'n, 21 Indian L. Rep. at
6060 ('The Cheyenne-Arapaho, lacking substantial financial resources, turned to taxation
as a means of providing revenue for the operation of day to day governmental services for
Indians and non-Indians in the area.').
195. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130,137 (1982).
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motions to dismiss federal court actions that should have been filed in tribal
court in the first place.
Like taxes, environmental regulations are an important means for
government to manage the economic activity within its jurisdiction.
Environmental regulations permit tribes to control or prevent the harmful
effects of exploration and production activities on the waters and other
resources of the Indian country. Whether tribes are now able to spend their
limited resources on developing and implementing sound oilfield
environmental programs, or whether those resources will be forced into
federal litigation, depends to some extent on the regulated companies. If the
oil companies are willing to learn to accept Indian tribes as sovereign
governments exercising regulatory authority, and to bring what litigation
they believe necessary in tribal court in the first instance,'" both the tribes
and the companies should benefit.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the last few years, Indian tribes have begun to assert
environmental authority over their water resources in significant numbers.
Initially, many of these tribes are focusing on establishing and enforcing
water quality standards for all surface waters within their Indian country.
Although WQS have limited direct applicability to oil and gas exploration
and production activities, the tribal assertions of environmental authority
contain important lessons for the industry.
But the development of tribal environmental programs also
contains vital lessons for the Indian tribes, lessons that are abundantly clear
from the Sac and Fox groundwater case." Tribes cannot rely on the
industry to protect tribal resources. Much of the history of relations between
Indian tribes and oil companies has been one of one-sided access to
information, bargaining power, and benefits.'" Neither the federal nor the
state governments rely on the oil industry to police itself in environmental
matters, and tribes should do no less.
Tribes also cannot rely on the federal trustee to protect tribal
resources from environmental damage by oil and gas operations. The Sac
and Fox saga may be an extreme example of BIA indifference, but federal
abdication of responsibility is not uncommon. Since the tribal amendments
196. Respect for tribal sovereignty does not mean that the oil companies roll over for
anything a tribe chooses to do. It does mean that the oil companies accept that tribes are
governments with authority over their territories, and that they respect tribal judicial
institutions by filing their challenges in tribal court.
197. See supra text accompanying notes 114-39.
198. See generally Royster, supra note 1.
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to the federal environmental laws in the mid-1980s,1" much of the
responsibility for environmental protection in Indian country has fallen to
the EPA rather than the BIA. And while the EPA has been a far stronger
supporter of tribal self-governance, evidence suggests that it too is not
adequately administering environmental protection programs in the Indian
country.0
0
That leaves environmental regulation of oilfield activities largely up
to the tribes themselves. Despite limited tribal financial and technical
resources, the potential effects of oilfleld contamination on tribal lands and
waters demand an effective and enforced regulatory regime. Using their
inherent regulatory powers and program authorization under the federal
environmental laws, tribes must take control over environmental protection
activities in the oil patch.
199. Following the EPA's initial Indian policy statement, see U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL
PRoTECTION AGENCY, EPA POLICY FOR THE ADMINISrRATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS
ON INDIAN RESERVATIONS (1984), the agency promoted a legislative agenda to put its policy
into practice. Between 1986 and 1990, three of the major environmental laws were amended
to treat tribes as states (TAS). Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990,42 U.S.C. § 7601(d) (1994);
Clean Water Act Amendments of 1987, 33 U.S.C. § 1377 (1994); Safe Drinking Water Act
Amendments of 1986,42 U.S.C. § 300j-11(a) (1994). See generally Judith V. Royster & Rory
SnowArrow Fausett, Contro of the Reservation Environment: Tribal Primacy, Federal Delegation,
and the Limits of State Intrusion, 64 WASH. L REV. 581, 619-22 (1989).
200. See WATER QUALITY SURVEY, supra note 52, at 66. The survey report notes that the
bulk of EPA funding is going to tribes which already have regulatory programs and financial
resources, "leav[ing] many reservations unprotected.' The report continues:
This would not matter quite so much if there were reliable indications that
the EPA itself is administering and enforcing the Clean Water Act on those
reservations where the Tribal governments are not. There are no such
indications, however, and we are quite alarmed that, given the universal
complaint of EPA Regional staff that they lack sufficient staff resources to
deal with all the Tribes that are pursuing TAS, no effort whatsoever is
being made in Indian communities that have not applied for TAS.
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